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Abstract 
This study investigates the links between domestic market regulation, dominant airline 
performance, and international market liberalization in Northeast Asia (NEA). The study 
focuses on China, where substantial regulations are still present in the aviation market, 
particularly in areas such as route entry, airport slot allocation, input supply, and aviation 
support services. These regulations limit the ability of entrant airlines to compete in hub 
airports, and allow dominant airlines to strengthen their market power and achieve substantial 
growth at the expense of their competitors. Current Chinese regulations assist major state-
owned carriers by suppressing domestic competition, particularly in markets linked to hub 
airports. If national policy in China continues to be guided by requirements created to support 
the dominant airlines, in the short term there will be limited liberalization on routes linked with 
hub airports. Promoting LCC services in the region is one practical alternative for the short 
term which could prevent major disruption to network carriers. This investigation suggests that 
Chinese airlines would be less resistant to bilateral liberalization with ASEAN, Oceanian or 
European nations than they would with other regions, as they are well positioned in these 
markets, and may be able to develop their hub airports into Asia’s gateways to Europe. In the 
long term, however, there is no substitute for full liberalization if NEA governments want their 
nations to fully benefit from enabling their carriers and hub airports to achieve global 
competitiveness.  
Keyword: air transport liberalization, dominant airlines, North East Asia, airline competition 
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1. Introduction 
 
Numerous studies of the aviation industry have confirmed that significant benefits can 
result from liberalizing the international market. Fu and Oum (2014), after a comprehensive 
review of the literature, concluded that there is strong evidence that liberalization brings 
substantial economic benefits to the countries involved. Liberalization has led to increased 
airline competition, lower average fares, increased frequency, improved load factor and airline 
productivity, increased traffic volumes, and new route services. These changes have not only 
resulted in higher employment and economic output in the aviation industry, but have also led 
to improvements in related sectors such as tourism, trade, and logistics. Despite these obvious 
benefits, many governments have been cautious towards embracing full liberalization. In 2003, 
57 liberalization agreements out of a total of 87 involved the U.S.  As of October 2012, over 
400 liberalized agreements were reached among 145 economies, of which more than 100 were 
U.S. open-skies agreements (ICAO 2013). Hooper (2014) noted that liberalization has gained 
a certain degree of momentum, but many countries are yet to eliminate restrictive regulations 
due to the concern about fair competition, and the fear that foreign airlines may dominate 
liberalized markets. 
Though slow, limited progress in aviation liberalization has been achieved in the Northeast 
Asian (NEA) region. These achievements have led to substantial growth in air traffic and 
service frequency for liberalized markets. In 2006, an open skies agreement was signed 
between Korea and the Chinese province of Shandong.  In 2007, Korea and Japan signed their 
bilateral open-skies agreement, with the exclusion of Japanese metropolitan markets involving 
Tokyo’s Narita and Haneda airports, which have capacity constraints. An agreement to 
liberalize services between Tokyo’s Narita International Airport and Incheon International 
Airport was subsequently reached in 2010, thanks to the airport capacity expansion projects in 
the Tokyo area. Considering the potential of this region, which comprises the world’s second, 
third, and fifteenth largest economies (i.e. China, Japan, and Korea 1 ), with a combined 
population totaling over 1.5 billion, the NEA international aviation market could have grown 
much faster had there been more liberalized bilateral air service agreements (ASAs). Therefore, 
it is valuable to investigate why governments in this region have not achieved more, and 
whether a clear roadmap can be designed to accelerate the process of liberalization in the 
coming years. 
Despite an increasing body of literature on air transport liberalization in recent years, there 
has been little examination of performance changes resulting from the liberalization process 
with dominant airlines, nor has there been an examination of the ways in which the 
competitiveness of a country’s aviation sector influences government policy on international 
transport. Dominant airlines often exert significant influences throughout the liberalization 
process. In fact, many governments have a history of supporting their “flag carriers”. For 
example, many European flag carriers involve state ownership, and governments have 
repeatedly helped their failing carriers (e.g. Sabena, Air France, Iberia, Alitalia). However, 
over time a number of airlines have been privatized, and under the EU requirement of “market 
economy investor principle” EU country governments are no longer allowed to provide state 
aid to their airlines2. This is not the case in the NEA region. In China, other than a few niche 
players such as Spring and Juneyao, most airlines are majority-owned by either the central or 
local government. The Chinese government now recognizes the “decisive role” played by 
markets in allocating resources3, but there is still no clear separation between its role as airline 
                                                             
1 At 2012 current price in US dollars, based on estimates by the United Nations Statistics Division. 
2 These principles however were not strictly followed in EU. For detailed discussions see Lykotrafiti (2008). 
3Decision made at the third plenary session of the 18th Communist Party of China Central Committee, held in 
Nov 2013. 
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owner and airline regulator. The influence of dominant airlines in China on aviation policies 
will not fade away quickly.   
Investigating the performance of major airlines, both overall and within the domestic 
market, helps predict their performance in the international market, and therefore informs the 
development of international strategies. Thus the attitude of regulators toward alternative 
liberalization policies can be examined. Many studies have examined the relationship between 
domestic market structures and export services. There are broadly two streams of literature 
here: the national-champion theory argues that with suppressed competition in domestic 
markets, firms can achieve large scale operations which enable them to obtain large market 
shares and profits in export markets (see Pagoulatos and Sorensen, 1976; Marvel, 1980; 
Krugman, 1984; Chou, 1986, for example). The second literature stream supports the 
competition theory, in which stiff competition in the domestic market forces firms to improve 
and innovate, thus achieving global competitiveness in the export market (see Audretsch and 
Yamawaki 1988; Porter 1990; Clark et al. 1992; Kim and Marion, 1997; Sakakibara and Porter, 
2001, for example). Clougherty and Zhang (2009) examined the airline market, and found that 
if an airline can improve its domestic performance, it is more likely to successfully compete in 
overseas markets.  
This study aims to investigate the links between domestic market regulation/deregulation, 
airline performance, and the liberalization of international markets in the NEA region, with a 
focus on China. As the world’s second largest aviation market after the US, the effects of 
China’s liberalization policies on the NEA region, and globally, are significant. Japan and 
Korea have made major progress in opening their skies to each other and to a few other 
countries. In comparison, the Chinese government has been more conservative after some 
initial opening up in 2007, when the bilateral service agreement between China and the US 
allowed the operation of more flights and designated airlines. Airlines in Korea and Japan have 
been privatized for some time, but the principle carriers in China are still majority-owned by 
the state. These close government ties may allow Chinese carriers to exert great influence over 
national policy. Despite the implementation of certain deregulation policies, there are still 
legacy regulations in the Chinese domestic market which limit competition. If these internal 
regulations for the domestic market cannot be phased out, it is unlikely they will be removed 
from the international market any time soon.  An examination of the status of the Chinese 
domestic market, in particular the performance of major airlines, will contribute to a better 
understanding of Chinese regulator’s aims and priorities. It will also help predict the future 
policy decisions of regulators. For the reasons mentioned here, this study will focus on the 
aviation market in China, while those of Korea and Japan will be discussed only if it is 
necessary to benchmark across the three countries. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the development 
path and current status of aviation markets in the NEA region, including domestic deregulation, 
international liberalization and the performance of major airlines. Section 3 discusses possible 
concerns of the Chinese government if a “national champion” philosophy is adopted to help 
major carriers to achieve large scale and global competitiveness. Section 4 reviews the 
development status of LCCs in the region, and whether they can promote liberalization in the 
NEA region without generating substantial market disruptions. The last section summarizes 
and concludes the study.  
 
 
2. Domestic market development and status of major airlines 
 
Over the past few years the Chinese aviation sector has experienced tremendous growth as 
the economy rapidly expanded and major investments were made in transport infrastructure 
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such as airports and air traffic control systems. The number of air passengers grew at an annual 
rate of 14.9% between 1990 and 2010. However, measuring the performance and 
competitiveness of Chinese airlines is not straightforward. In 2010, the earnings of Chinese 
carriers reached RMB35.1 billion (USD5.18 billion), about 60% of the industry’s global profits 
that year. However, China Eastern Airlines, the second largest carrier in the country, received 
a government capital injection of RMB10 billion (US$1.45bn) in 2009, and over RMB3 billion 
(US$0.44bn) in 2012, to reduce its exceedingly high debt ratio. The other two largest airlines, 
China Southern and Air China, also received capital injections in 2012, of RMB2 billion 
(US$0.29bn) and RMB1 billion (US$0.15bn), respectively. There was no economic recession 
during this time, nor any major disruptive event such as the SARS outbreak or terrorist attacks. 
Therefore, though Chinese airlines appear to have grown rapidly in terms of scale, their 
performance needs to be carefully examined. This section reviews market structure and 
development paths in performance of the Chinese aviation market. Strategies of Chinese 
carriers towards liberalization and deregulation can be interpreted and evaluated based on 
reviews of market performance. 
 
2.1. The development path of Chinese domestic market 
 
Before 1978, the Chinese aviation industry was operated as a quasi-military unit. 
Commercialization of airlines began in March 1978, when the management/regulatory 
authority was transferred from the air force to the State Council. It was not until 1987 that 
airlines were corporatized.  At that time six major state-owned airlines, Air China, China 
Southern, China Eastern, China Southwest, China Northwest, and China Northern, were 
formed based on six regional bureaus.  Starting in 2002, significant restructuring policies were 
introduced in the aviation sector: market consolidation, government control, and new roles for 
provincial and municipal governments. 
 
 Market Consolidation: From 2002 the Chinese government initiated market 
consolidation among major carriers: China Eastern Airlines merged with China 
Northwest and Yunnan airlines, China Southern took over China Northern and Xinjiang 
airlines, and Air China gained control of China Southwest and CNAC airlines. In 2010 
the market was further consolidated when China Eastern acquired Shanghai Airlines 
and Air China controlled Shenzhen Airlines. Consolidated airlines also established 
many subsidiary carriers, often jointly with local governments serving as niche 
operators in regional markets. For example, Air China holds shares in Shandong 
Airlines, Tibet Airlines, Dalian Airlines, Air China Inner Mongolia, and Air Macau. 
The same consolidation strategy has been adopted by other major airlines such as China 
Southern, China Eastern, and Hainan Airlines. In summary, the Chinese government 
has allowed, and in many cases coordinated, mergers and consolidation in the airline 
market. Competition or anti-trust issues have not been a serious concern to the 
regulator.  
 
 Government control: The preference for scale and government control is also evident 
in the input supply market. The China National Aviation Fuel (CNAF), a Fortune 500 
company, holds the de facto monopoly of aviation fuel in China, though some airlines 
have limited control of fuel supplies in a few domestic airports. The China Aviation 
Supplies Holding Company, another state-owned company, has a significant market 
share in aircraft purchase and leasing. The China Travel Sky Holding Company 
provides the IT backbone for domestic ticket sales and reservations, and airport 
passenger systems for over 100 airports. In 2002, the six aviation groups (i.e. Air China, 
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China Eastern and China Southern airline groups, CNAF, China Aviation Supply, and 
China Travel Sky) were “detached” from the Civil Aviation Administration of China 
(CAAC) and are now under the control of the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission of the State Council. Ties between CAAC and these state-
controlled groups still remain strong.  Many senior officials at CAAC serve as top 
executives of these six groups. 
 
 Roles of provincial and municipal governments: Provincial and municipal governments 
play significant roles in the aviation industry. Apart from Beijing Capital Airport and 
the airports in Tibet, all other airports had been transferred to local governments by 
2004.  Although airport operations and pricing are regulated by the central government, 
local governments are responsible for airport investments.   Airports are classified into 
different “categories,” each under a set of pricing schemes defined by the CAAC. In 
addition, many second-tier airlines (in terms of size) are founded/co-founded by local 
governments, mainly to promote aviation services to their specific province or city. 
Therefore, interests and objectives of local governments are usually consistent with 
their own airports, but not always consistent with those of the airlines.  Airlines are 
most concerned about their own revenues and profits, while local governments are most 
concerned with traffic volume and service quality in their regions, as better aviation 
services contribute to the well-being of local airports and economies. 
 
Compared to the aviation markets in developed economies, the commercialization process 
of Chinese markets started much later. Currently, all major carriers are majority-owned and 
managed by either central or local governments. Most input and supporting services are also 
controlled by state-owned companies holding significant market power. The central 
government owns the largest three airline groups and the dominant/monopoly companies 
which provide fuelling services, ticketing and airport IT services, and fleet purchasing services. 
The regulator has shown little concern over market consolidation or the reduction of 
competition. Only a few private airlines have been allowed to enter the market, and they are 
much smaller than their state-owned counterparts. Most airports are under the control of local 
governments, which are responsible for financial performance and infrastructure investments. 
Therefore, these local governments may have different objectives from those of the dominant 
carriers. Local governments are generally concerned with better aviation services in their 
respective regions, which benefit local airports and social welfare.  
 
2.2. Airline route entry, network development, and airline competition 
 
Route and network planning is very important as this directly affects airlines’ costs and 
revenue. Piermartini and Rousova (2008) reviewed Air Service Agreements (ASAs) in 
international markets, and found that although 60% of the ASAs allow multiple designations, 
40% permit single designation only. Thus, two airlines at most compete for the specific 
international routes. Fu et al. (2010) and Fu and Oum (2014) concluded that liberalization 
allows airlines to optimize their networks for various objectives: to improve cost efficiency by 
exploiting “economies of traffic density”, to enhance service quality by initiating direct flights 
and/or by increasing flight frequency, to price more aggressively, or to compete more 
strategically. Regulation on route entry has been removed in most mature markets in North 
America and Europe, and in Asia-Pacific countries such as Japan, Korea, Australia, and New 
Zealand. 
In the Chinese domestic markets, route entry and airport slot allocations are monitored 
and/or regulated depending on whether hub airports are involved. The details of the regulations 
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have evolved over the years. Currently, when airlines plan to enter a new market defined as an 
airport-pair, they need to either apply for approval or simply register/report in advance. The 
following three types of route entry must be approved: (I) when the entry involves an airport 
that is slot controlled or capacity constrained as defined by the regulator, (II) when the entry 
involves busy airports or routes with large traffic volume, or (III) airports that have special 
arrangements related to the safety of flight operations. However, for the following three types 
of route entry an airline only needs to register/report in advance but does not need to seek 
approval: (1) airport pairs not included in I-III above, (2) cargo flights, or (3) airport pairs 
defined by the CAAC or regional bureaus.  
Before 2010, approvals for route entry were required for most large airports in provincial 
capital cities and metropolitan areas. Under the current rules, entries involving the four airports 
in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou (i.e. Beijing Capital Airport, Shanghai Hongqiao Airport, 
Shanghai Pudong Airport, and Guangzhou Baiyun Airport) need to be approved. However, 
airlines that use these four airports as hubs do not need to seek approval for flights from them 
to other destinations. For example, Air China has a hub at Beijing, so there is no need to seek 
approval for flight between Beijing and Xi’an, but the carrier needs to apply to increase 
frequency between Beijing and Shanghai. As of December 2013, 88% of the entry rights to 
3,353 domestic routes were by registration only without the need to seek formal approval. This 
ratio has been increasing over the years. 
In addition to route entry regulation, there are also slot controls in congested airports. 
Airport slot allocation and coordination are under the control of the central government (i.e. 
the CAAC) and regional bureaus. Regional bureaus are responsible for domestic airline flights 
and the CAAC coordinates slots for international flights. Traffic volumes have outpaced airport 
capacity growth in many destinations, so in recent years an increasing number of airports have 
required slot coordination, as reported in Table 1: 
 
< Table 1 here > 
 
When a regional bureau manages airport slots, an allocation committee is formed, which 
comprises representatives from the regional bureau, regional air traffic control, airlines, and 
the airport. One key responsibility of this committee is to suggest the slot allocation ratio 
between hub carriers vs. airlines based in other airports. Committee members vote on important 
decisions, with an overall allocation of 1,000 votes for each topic requiring a vote. Based on 
the shares of allocated slots in the previous year, a total of 600 votes are distributed among the 
airlines, and the remainder of the voting rights are shared among regional bureaus, airports, 
and air traffic control agencies. For routine operation and management, airport slots are 
allocated among the following services, in order of priority: 
 
1. Existing flights (i.e. grandfathered rights) 
2. Entrant airlines initiating services at the airport 
3. Hub carriers with priority over non-hub carriers 
4. New routes by airlines currently serving the airport 
5. Airlines achieving high utilization rates of current slots  
 
In view of the current practices in the global aviation industry, the slot allocation 
regulations in China are not unreasonable. In mature markets, such as Europe and North 
America, the first step of slot allocation is to prioritize incumbent airlines with existing slots 
so they can obtain and maintain the same slots in the next period (“grandfather rights”). If the 
existing slots are to be protected for the next period, they must be used at least 80% of the time 
in the current period (the “use it or lose it” rule). Once the grandfather rights are confirmed, 
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the remaining slots, together with those newly created (through improved air control 
technology, voluntary relinquishment, insufficient use, or added capacity) are grouped in a ‘slot 
pool’, and up to 50% are set aside for new entrants (the “new entrant” rule). The rest are 
allocated free of charge to incumbents. This slot allocation approach, characterized by 
“grandfather rights,” the “use it or lose it” rule, and the “new entrant” rule is currently adopted 
in many countries, but it has long been criticized as inefficient (Matthews and Menaz, 2003). 
For example, an incumbent airline may deter entrant airlines by scheduling small-sized aircraft 
over non-core routes, or by leasing slots to alliance members for a short period, so the 
incumbent can continue to hold onto slots that are under-utilized. With “slot baby-sitting” 
strategies such as these, incumbent airlines may deter entrants by preempting the markets via 
airport slot hoarding. Many studies, including those commissioned by governments, have 
investigated the use of slot auctions or other market-based instruments (e.g., congestion 
pricing, slot sales, and slot trading) thus slots are allocated to carriers that attach the highest 
economic value to them (DotEcon, 2001 and 2006; Sentance, 2003; Maldoom, 2003; National 
Economic Research Associates, 2004; Madas and Zografos, 2006, 2008 and 2010; Brueckner, 
2009; Verhoef, 2010). However, these proposals have largely remained theoretical, as they face 
various practical challenges and political concerns.  
In China, the regulations for both route entry and airport slot allocation are much more 
restrictive than those adopted in mature markets such as Europe and North America (e.g. 
London Heathrow, JFK, Chicago O’Hare, etc.). In these mature markets, once a slot is secured 
and in use, the airline can use it for any route without seeking further approval. Chinese airlines, 
however, often need to secure approval for both route entry and airport slots when they enter 
or add frequencies in routes linking to hubs in metropolitan areas (i.e. Beijing, Shanghai, and 
Guangzhou). In the European and North American mature markets it has been a common 
practice to give priorities to new entrant airlines or new services, while in the Chinese domestic 
market, the hub carriers receive preferential treatment. With the exception of the four regulated 
airports in China, there is no need for hub carriers to seek route entry approval for initiating 
services to their own hub airports. These carriers also have priority in securing airport slots at 
their hubs. It has been claimed by the regulator that these policies have two objectives: to 
promote competition and to facilitate dominant airlines developing their hubs. However, the 
preferential treatment given to hub carriers makes it difficult for other airlines to compete at 
major hubs. This is in marked contrast to the policies adopted by the US Department of 
Transportation, which has attempted to introduce competition at hub airports and to control the 
market power of hub carriers.4 
 
2.3. Performance of aviation markets and major airlines  
 
There is a two-way relationship between government policy and market performance in 
China. On the one hand, aviation policies have been revised over the years to reflect changing 
market conditions and to achieve evolving policy objectives. On the other hand, these policies 
have significantly influenced the market equilibrium and therefore the performance of airlines. 
For example, large airports in China account for a significant proportion of the national market, 
                                                             
4 Many studies on the US aviation markets have found that dominance at an airport allows a carrier to achieve 
substantially higher mark-up above cost, a benefit known as the “hub premium” in the literature (Borenstein, 
1989; GAO, 1989 and 1990). The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT, 2001) believes that it was the lack 
of price competition, not those other rationales, that explained high prices at hub markets. Therefore, it is required 
that each of the large airports with a “dominant” carrier must submit a plan on how they intend to promote airport 
access, entry and competition to the US Department of Transportation (DOT) (FAA, 1999). The requirement of 
submitting a competition plan was incorporated into the “Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act 
for the 21st Century” legislated in 2000. According to this act, large and medium airports that exceed a certain 
threshold of concentration are required to submit competition plans. 
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therefore special arrangements regarding route entry and slot allocation have been made at 
these airports. Government policies have given preferential consideration to hub carriers, who 
have been able to further strengthen their market positions at major hubs and in the national 
market. The market shares of the top ten airports for the 1998-2009 period are reported in Table 
2. Over the years, they have accounted for more than half of the national passenger market and 
more than 70% of the national cargo markets. It is therefore of critical importance for airlines 
to secure their market shares at major airports. 
 
<Table 2 here > 
 
The overall effects of route entry and slot allocation are unclear. As shown in Table 3, 
flight frequency has substantially increased, though with significant variations among airports 
of different sizes. However, the average aircraft size for flights linking the largest airports 
actually decreased from 2002 to 2008. This could reflect the progress of Chinese carriers in 
constructing hub-and-spoke networks (which require extensive feeder operations using small 
aircraft), or the increasing quality of airline services with reduced schedule delays. On the other 
hand, it may be an indication that precious airport slots could have been better utilized with 
larger aircraft, or that the current slot allocation scheme is not optimal from the perspective of 
social welfare. Zhang et al. (2013, 2014) examined airline competition in China and found a 
hub-premium effect similar to the result identified in the US airline market. Wang et al. (2014a) 
also noted that the yields of Chinese carriers on the largest routes are slightly higher than the 
average yield in the United States. Considering the lower per capita income and input prices in 
China, airline competition is certainly not at the level it should be. 
 
<Table 3 here> 
 
The dominant airlines in China have been able to take advantage of many favorable factors 
over the past decades: the Chinese economy has been growing rapidly, leading to very high 
demands for air travel. Such demand growth has been particularly high in major airports, where 
hub carriers enjoy substantial competitive advantages under the regulations of route entry and 
airport slot allocation. The Chinese government has encouraged major airlines to further 
consolidate, and the leading carriers were therefore able to scale up remarkably quickly. Table 
4 shows that Chinese airlines have been growing much faster than their peers in the NEA 
region. In 2001, levels of revenue, passengers carried, and numbers of aircraft for Chinese 
carriers were barely comparable to their Japanese and Korean competitors. However, during 
the period 2001 to 2012, the “big three” Chinese carriers (Air China, China Southern, and 
China Eastern) recorded about 700% growth in revenue. In comparison, Korean carriers 
increased revenue by less than 300%, and Japanese carriers by less than 50%. By 2012, in terms 
of revenue, passengers and aircraft, Chinese carriers had grown to almost twice the size of the 
nearest competitor from either country. It is clear that Chinese airlines have achieved 
remarkable growth in scale. Hooper et al. (1996) and Hooper (1998) compared the (on-going) 
deregulation process in India to those in developed countries. Their studies concluded that 
although the level of economic development is an important determinant of market 
performances, the fundamental economics of the airline industry apply to both developing and 
developed countries. The Indian market has sufficient scale to support competition, which 
provides the most powerful incentives for efficiency and responsiveness to consumers’ 
demands. Although China will remain as a developing country in the foreseeable future, its 
major carriers are now among the largest airlines in the world. Policies designed to protect 
them make little sense. 
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<Table 4 here > 
 
Chinese airlines were also able to grow their profits significantly, albeit slightly slower 
than the growth in scale. Table 4 shows that the profits of the Chinese “big three” grew by over 
500% from 2001 to 2012. However, they barely improved their competitiveness in the global 
market, as the “national champion” theory predicted – the share of international traffic in terms 
of revenue passenger kilometers (PRK) actually decreased between 2001 and 2012, and lagged 
far behind other major network carriers in NEA. Domestic success has not enabled Chinese 
airlines to bridge the gap of competitiveness with other airlines. Wang et al. (2014a) 
benchmarked the Total Factor Productivity of Chinese airlines against major network carriers 
in Europe, Asia, and North America. They concluded that although Chinese airlines were able 
to significantly improve their efficiency, the efficiency gaps with North American carriers 
actually grew, as reported in Table 5.  
 
< Table 5 here> 
 
In summary, major airports are of critical importance to Chinese airlines due to their large 
market potential. However, traffic growth has outpaced capacity in these markets, making 
government regulation on route entry and slot allocation a critical factor in determining the 
performance of airlines. Route entry regulation has been phased out in all but four major 
airports in the metropolitan areas, but an increasing number of airports are under slot control. 
The route entry and airport slot allocation mechanisms together favor hub carriers’ network 
development, while putting other airlines at a significant disadvantage. Flight frequencies have 
increased rapidly in all airports, resulting in a better quality of service and reduced schedule 
delay for travelers. However, the average aircraft size has actually decreased slightly for the 
ten largest airports. This may reflect the efforts of airlines to build up hub-and-spoke networks, 
but may also suggest that precious slots are not optimally utilized. Chinese airlines have been 
able to achieve very high yield in dense routes, due to a lack of competition in the domestic 
markets, particularly in routes linking hub airports. 
The phenomenal growth in the domestic markets enabled Chinese carriers to expand and 
increase their profits. However, success in domestic markets did not make them substantially 
more competitive in international markets. Efficiency levels are still far behind those of 
industry leaders, and Chinese airlines’ shares of international revenue have decreased over the 
past decades, remaining well below their NEA counterparts. In summary, Chinese airlines are 
now well positioned to compete globally in terms of scale, but they have yet to identify a 
strategy for fully leveraging the favorable conditions they have enjoyed domestically. The 
following section examines their global competitiveness, and their preferences for international 
aviation policy. 
 
 
3. Implications of liberalization for dominant airlines 
 
Many studies have examined the effects of liberalization using observed industry data. 
These ex post studies found strong evidence that if the well-being and social welfare of travelers 
are considered alongside airline profits, liberalization generally brings significant benefits to 
all countries involved. In addition, empirical investigations of various sectors including the 
airline industry have provided convincing evidence that the “national champion” model rarely 
works, and it is competition that brings innovation and improvements in the long term. Even if 
the Chinese government still follows the “national champion” strategy in the coming years, a 
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more deregulated market would encourage Chinese airlines to compete, as they are now among 
the largest airlines in the world (shown in Table 4). Few industries, including the airline sector, 
can become globally competitive through government protection. The Japanese government 
had for decades given its “national carriers” direct and indirect assistance, but JAL still filed 
for bankruptcy protection in 2009. More competition has since been introduced in the Japanese 
domestic and international markets, yet JAL has recently emerged as a stronger airline. 
Therefore, we believe that the three countries in the NEA region should liberalize their skies 
to maximize the benefits to the overall economy, instead of continuing the strategy of 
protecting their airlines.   
Policy and political considerations may still override economic considerations, however, 
and NEA governments may not change their policies immediately. Major airlines may continue 
to significantly influence liberalization policies. In this section, we identify the opportunities 
and challenges of liberalization for the major airlines of the region, so as to identify their 
preferences and strategies. This will enable us to predict the likely liberalization processes in 
the short term, assuming public policies remain influenced by major airlines over the next few 
years. However, compared to full liberalization, this is obviously not the most favorable 
outcome. 
 
3.1. Priority markets and airline performances 
 
The three countries in NEA have experienced strong growth in economy and international 
trade at different times. By the 1980s, Japan’s economy was strong with high export levels. In 
the aviation industry, priority was given to the development of North American routes, with 
both Japanese and US carriers establishing good networks and high frequency services to the 
United States. The Korean economy and aviation industry developed in a similar way, with 
major liberalization agreements signed between Korea and the US after the Asian financial 
crisis. In comparison, although trade and passenger volumes between China and the US have 
been growing quickly since the early 1990s, the North American network of China’s airlines 
was far behind their Japanese and Korean counterparts. Table 6 shows that in 2001 three 
Chinese carriers served three North American destinations with 23 weekly flights. Japanese 
(and Korean) airlines served 10 (and 11) destinations with 198 (and 92) weekly flights in the 
same year. Chinese carriers have since developed their networks, and as of July 2014, the 
numbers of North American destinations and weekly frequencies of Chinese carriers had 
reached those of their Japanese and Korean competitors. There are, however, more Chinese 
carriers serving this market than Japanese and Korean (two airlines each), thus that the service 
of individual Chinese airlines is still likely to be inferior.  
 
<Table 6 here> 
 
Geographic location and airport capacity are also important in determining the competition 
among NEA carriers for services to North America. Without an open-skies agreement between 
China and the US, a regional NEA open-skies agreement would enable Japanese and Korean 
carriers to use Tokyo and Incheon as gateway hubs to North America. Indeed, many Chinese 
passengers are now taking connection flights from Seoul.  
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Table 7 shows that network connectivity of Chinese carriers to European destinations is 
generally better than the connectivity of other NEA airlines in terms of airports served, weekly 
frequency, and number of seats offered within our sample period from 2001 to 2014. In terms 
of geographic location and market potential, major Chinese airports such as Guangzhou, 
Chengdu, and Xi’an may serve as Asian gateway hubs to Europe. Guangzhou airport has a 
large capacity and a rapidly growing local market, so it is well positioned to compete with other 
Asian hubs such as Bangkok, Singapore, or even Dubai in the long term. China Southern has 
been making good progress in developing the “Canton route” via the Guangzhou airport, which 
could potentially feed traffic from Southeast Asia, Australia, and New Zealand to its European 
services. China Southern may also be able to capture a share of the traffic previously served by 
the “Kangaroo routes” linking Australia and New Zealand to Europe. 
 
< Table 7 here> 
 
In terms of international network development in Asia and Oceania, Chinese and Korean 
airlines performed better than Japanese airlines. Table 8 shows that, in 2012 and 2014, Korean 
carriers served more destinations, whereas Chinese airlines provided more frequent services 
and more scheduled seats. Japanese carriers consistently lagged behind other NEA airlines. 
This is probably due to their high costs, which make them less competitive when serving 
relatively price-sensitive consumers. Japanese carriers also serve fewer Chinese cities than 
their Korean competitors. More investigations are needed to identify the main reasons why 
Japanese carriers have limited network coverage in Asia and Oceania. 
 
< Table 8 here > 
 
In summary, Japanese and Korean carriers have better network coverage to destinations in 
North America, whereas Chinese airlines are better positioned for services to Europe. For 
aviation services to Asia and Oceania, Japanese airlines lag behind Chinese and Korean 
carriers. Chinese airlines are therefore likely to have the following preferences in aviation 
policy:  
 
 Chinese airlines will be less resistant toward bilateral liberalization with ASEAN 
countries, Australia, and New Zealand, as a more liberal regional market will help 
Chinese airlines develop their hubs as gateways to Europe, currently Guangzhou and in 
the long term Chengdu, Other than Singapore Airlines and Qantas, few network carriers 
in these countries can compete with Chinese airlines for European destinations. 
Therefore, bilateral liberalization with these countries may not put too much 
competitive pressure on Chinese airlines, but will significantly help develop the 
connecting passenger markets between these countries and Europe. 
 
 In the absence of open-skies agreements with the US and Canada, Chinese airlines may 
have some concerns about creating a single aviation market with Korea and Japan in 
the short term: Japanese and Korean carriers have good network coverage to North 
American destinations, allowing them to feed traffic from China and the rest of Asia to 
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their gateway hubs in Incheon and Tokyo. There are many more airports in China than 
in Japan and Korea, so liberalization will bring network benefits to Japanese and 
Korean airlines, as they will be able to connect many more spoke markets to their hubs. 
Similar observations have been made by Lau et al. (2012). Their study found that when 
direct air services were allowed across the Taiwan Straits, airlines in Taiwan were able 
to improve their networks more than carriers in mainland China.  
 
3.2. Performance of major airports and effects on hub airlines 
 
Major airports can exert considerable influence over national liberalization policies. The 
connectivity and competitiveness of a major hub positively effects its hub carrier’s 
development. The performances of major hubs in the NEA region are reported in Table 9. 
Unlike analysis in the above section on airlines, this table reports all the services of both 
domestic and foreign carriers. 
 
< Table 9 here> 
 
As evidenced in Table 9, for comparisons related to hub airports connectivity: 
 
 The network connectivity of Japanese carriers in Asia and Oceania lagged behind their 
NEA competitors, but due to the frequent services of foreign carriers, Narita has 
comparable connectivity to most NEA hubs, except that of Incheon. Several factors 
have contributed to Incheon’s superior network connectivity: the Korean government 
has actively promoted aviation liberalization in recent years, and their hub policy 
restricts international services to Seoul Gimpo airport. In the long term, relaxing this 
policy would allow more international LCC services at Gimpo. This issue will be 
discussed in Section 4.  
 
 For European destinations, Beijing is far ahead of other hubs, with 24 airports 
connected via direct flights, followed by Narita (16), Incheon (14), Shanghai Pudong 
(12), and Guangzhou (5). With Beijing’s large market potential and status as the 
national capital, this advantage is likely to continue for many years. Geographically 
Guangzhou Baiyun airport is in fact better positioned to serve as a European gateway. 
China Southern has made good progress in developing its “Canton routes” in recent 
years, although overall Guangzhou airport still has a long way to go. The airport may 
therefore be keen to support liberalization policies, which may allow more frequencies 
and destinations to be added by both domestic and foreign carriers. 
 
 When foreign carriers’ services are taken into account, airport development analysis is 
very different from that for major airlines. All three international hubs in China (Beijing 
capital airport, Shanghai Pudong airport, and Guangzhou Baiyun airport) have better 
connections to North America than Incheon and Narita in terms of number of 
destinations and weekly frequency. This probably explains why US carriers have hoped 
for bilateral liberalization with China, which will enable more destinations and 
frequencies to be added. The demand for passenger and cargo flow between the world’s 
two largest economies is very high. Protecting home carriers in this market will not 
only prevent consumers from enjoying better services, but also prevent NEA airlines 
from optimizing their networks in the region.  
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3.3. Liberalization policy preferences of Chinese airlines and hub airports 
 
With on-going processes of airport privatization, commercialization and localization, 
major hubs will gain increasing attention from local and central governments. The strategy and 
preference of both major airlines and hub airports will therefore be taken into consideration 
when regulators design national aviation policies. A clear understanding of the strategies of 
airlines and airports (vested interests) will help us predict possible government aviation 
policies.   
In terms of home carriers’ performance and network connectivity, the services of Chinese 
airlines to North America are still slightly behind other NEA carriers.  Geographic locations of 
Incheon and Narita airports have made them ideal gateways for traffic between Asia and North 
America. Regional liberalization among NEA countries will allow Japanese and Korean 
carriers to compete for the China – US routes by feeding traffic to their own hubs. The main 
Chinese airlines are therefore unlikely to be enthusiastic about such a liberalization policy. 
Instead, they may be less resistant to liberalization packages with the EU and the rest of Asia 
and Oceania. Their services are relatively well established for European destinations, and the 
airports of Guangzhou and Chengdu may be developed as gateways to Europe with more feeder 
routes from Asia and Oceania. Other than Singapore Airlines and Qantas, there are no other 
strong network carriers in the region. Therefore, if the Chinese government continues its 
support of major state-owned carriers, such as the “big three”, liberalization with ASEAN 
countries, Oceania, and Europe will be more of a priority than creating a single aviation market 
in the NEA region. 
When the services of foreign carriers are also taken into consideration, hub airports in 
Chinese metropolitan areas appear better positioned to become gateways to both Europe and 
Oceania than Incheon and Narita, and their competitiveness on North American routes also 
increases significantly. Recent studies suggest that the growth of dominant airlines, and vertical 
arrangements with airports, affect the equilibrium of aviation markets, leading to interactive 
dynamics between hub carrier performance and airport development (see Barbot, 2009; Fu and 
Zhang, 2010; Zhang et al., 2010; Fu et al., 2011; Homsombat et al., 2011; Yang et al., 2015, 
for example). This implies that Chinese carriers have not yet fully leveraged the market 
potential and domestic dominance at their hubs in order to develop international services. This 
has in turn prevented the hub airports from achieving their full potential. In comparison, 
Incheon airport has rapidly established itself as an important international gateway due to 
Korea’s recent liberalization policies and the international expansion of the hub airlines. 
Although there are positive dynamics between major airports and their hub carriers, policies 
protecting home airlines may actually constrain rather than strengthen the competitiveness of 
airports. Chinese hub airports currently have limited influence on international aviation policy, 
but in the long term they will have more reasons to be supporters of liberalization. 
In the short term, there is a strong likelihood that major airlines in the NEA region, 
particularly those in China, will continue to exercise significant influence over their nations’ 
liberalization policies. We believe that governments should prioritize consumer well-being and 
national interests. One immediate strategy for encouraging liberalization is to promote LCC 
services in the region. The following section evaluates the possible effects of this policy option. 
 
 
4. Liberalization by facilitating low cost carrier services 
 
Most LCCs in the NEA region were created in the last couple of years, though some are 
long-established. Many new entrants in Korea and Japan are affiliated with incumbent network 
carriers. In certain markets, such ownership structures may help LCCs secure approval for route 
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entry and airport slots. The study by Homsombat et al. (2014) into the Australian domestic 
market reveals that a “dual-brand” strategy, jointly offering network carrier services and LCC 
services, may bring competitive advantages to an airline group. However, such 
ownership/affiliation arrangements could lead to future complications, as network carriers may 
block the entry of foreign LCCs to undercut their parent airlines. Many LCCs have chosen to 
form local joint ventures when expanding their businesses in another country. Such a strategy 
has been adopted by AirAsia and Jetstar when entering markets such as Thailand, the 
Philippines, and Japan. Another strategy of overseas expansion is to serve foreign destinations 
under rules set by bilateral service agreements. In this section we will focus on the bilateral 
approach. 
Promoting LCC services in the NEA region can be a good alternative to full liberalization 
in the medium term. To cut costs, LCCs usually provide no-frill point-to-point services in 
short/medium-distance markets. Connection services are normally not offered as they 
significantly increase baggage handling costs and turnaround time at airports. Improved LCC 
services do not therefore significantly affect the competition between network carriers on inter-
continental routes. Whereas route entry and slot allocation at hub airports are closely 
monitored, regulators and major carriers are usually not concerned with the expansion of LCCs 
at regional airports. Fu et al. (2015) investigated the pricing and network development pattern 
of the largest LCC in China, Spring Airlines. They concluded that similar to LCCs in developed 
markets, Spring prefers to serve markets with high traffic volumes out of its operational base 
in Shanghai. However, in dense routes Spring’s capacity and market share are constrained to 
low levels, likely due to government regulation, and/or a “puppy dog” strategy adopted by the 
carrier in order to earn profits without triggering a price war. In comparison, the carrier's market 
shares in relatively thin routes are significantly higher. In certain cases, the LCC initiated some 
new routes to small regional airports which had not been served by any airline before. Local 
governments welcome new services, which improve their airports’ connectivity and contribute 
to the regional economy. The low cost base allows LCCs to serve thin markets, which are not 
feasible for network carriers. Disruption to the existing market equilibrium will be relatively 
moderate. Therefore, promoting LCC entry can be a feasible and useful first step toward full 
liberalization.  
The profiles of NEA LCCs are summarized in Table 10. As of June 2014, most LCCs had 
less than 20 aircraft in service, giving them a relatively small market share. Table 11 also shows 
that NEA LCCs have mainly focused on the domestic market. Some serve a good number of 
international destinations (e.g. Spring Airlines in China, Jeju Air, Air Busan, Jin Air in Korea), 
but the low total frequencies reveal that these services are rather limited. LCCs could not 
therefore reduce costs by exploiting economies of traffic density. Both individual government 
regulations and bilateral service agreements impose limitations. For example, foreign LCC 
services are permitted mostly at the Incheon airport, even though the Seoul Gimpo airport has 
capacity and is closer to the city. The traffic rights allocated by the Korean Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure and Transport (MOLIT) are ad hoc without clearly defined rules, making it 
difficult for LCCs to optimize and plan their service offerings.    
  
< Table 10 and Table 11 here> 
 
There are signs that China is progressively allowing foreign LCCs into both large and 
medium-sized airports. Table 12 shows that as of July 2014, foreign LCCs served 36 Chinese 
airports. Guangzhou, Hangzhou, Shenzhen, and Shanghai Pudong airports had the highest 
weekly LCC flights. Qingdao has 20 LCC flights a week, mainly due to the provincial open-
skies agreement signed between Korea and Shandong province, which allowed Korean carriers 
to offer 14 weekly flights to the city. Otherwise, Korean LCCs have quite limited services to 
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China, despite direct flights to 22 airports. For example, eight airports were served with only 
one LCC flight per week as of July 2014. A closer look of the data revealed that these services 
were all recently initiated by Jin Air, an LCC owned by Korean Air. Therefore, more flights 
may be added in the near future, and the LCC may have been assisted by its affiliated network 
carrier (i.e. Korean Air) in entering these routes. No Japanese LCC services were available at 
Chinese airports, although Chinese LCCs served four medium sized Japanese airports 
(Hiroshima, Ibaraki, Saga, and Takamatsu) with a total of 18 weekly flights in July 2014.  
 
< Table 12 here> 
  
There are in general signs that China is progressively opening up its skies to foreign LCCs. 
A number of airports are now accessible, though services are still concentrated at a few airports 
for the time being. Several factors may have contributed to this: as discussed previously, LCCs 
usually do not provide connection services so will not contribute competitive advantages to 
their parent airlines (if any). Major Chinese network carriers will be less concerned about 
competition in the short term. The lower average costs and smaller aircraft used by LCCs 
suggest they are better positioned to serve medium-sized airports, which are usually not 
congested and of secondary importance to Chinese network carriers. Provincial and municipal 
governments will also welcome foreign LCC services, which benefit local airports, businesses, 
and social welfare. It should therefore be possible for foreign LCCs to significantly expand 
within non-hub Chinese airports in the future.  
The open-skies agreement between Korea and Japan has led to their LCCs having 
reasonably good network coverage in each other’s territory. For example, Japanese LCCs have 
five daily flights (35 weekly flights) to Incheon and one daily flight to Busan.  Korean LCCs 
have frequent services to major airports such as Kansai, Narita, Fukuoka and Nagoya, and to 
five other regional airports. Compared to China, international and domestic LCC services are 
better developed in Japan and Korea, although LCC penetration rates are still behind other 
Asian markets such as Malaysia, Singapore, and Australia. Some constraints to further 
development should be removed; for example, the Seoul Gimpo airport is close to the city 
center and has convenient ground transport systems, but in 2001, all international services were 
relocated to Incheon airport, causing a 40% reduction in passenger volume almost overnight. 
Other than a few routes such as Seoul – Jeju Island, domestic aviation markets have achieved 
little growth over the years, due to competition from high-speed rail services. To revive its 
business, Gimpo has been reducing operation costs and trying to improve its non-aeronautical 
services. In addition, some regional flights to Japan, China, and Taiwan have been reintroduced 
along with services such as customs, immigration, and quarantine (CIQ). Seoul Gimpo airport 
is ideal for all types of international services. Currently, however, the Korean government has 
not allocated any traffic rights to foreign LCCs at Gimpo, even though there is no congestion 
or slot constraint. The Ministry’s misguided policy of promoting Seoul-Incheon airport as the 
only hub is preventing Seoul-Gimpo from fully realizing its market potential. It is our view that 
government regulations and intervention such as this should be removed, enabling airlines to 
optimize their operations in a deregulated environment. 
 
 
5. Summary, Conclusion, and further Thought 
 
The benefits of air transport liberalization have been confirmed by many studies. However, 
much of the NEA market remains regulated, despite strong economic growth and increased 
international trade in the region, along with completion of trans-border open-skies agreements. 
Governments should aim to improve social welfare of their nations, and their economies as a 
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whole, rather than aiding only those with vested interests, i.e., major network carriers. 
However, in practice the region’s dominant airlines have exerted significant influences against 
liberalization. Investigations into the performance of major airlines will therefore help predict 
their strategies for developing internationally, and their attitudes toward alternative 
liberalization policies. An examination of legacy regulations in domestic markets also provides 
insight into policy priorities and philosophies of regulators in international markets. The 
implication is clear: if certain regulations have been persistent in the domestic markets, they 
are unlikely to be removed for foreign carriers in the near future.  
Our investigation into the NEA aviation markets, particularly China, reveals that 
substantial legacy regulations are still present in the Chinese domestic market, despite rapid 
growth of the aviation industry in the past decades. Specifically, our examination leads us to 
the following conclusions:  
 
 In the Chinese aviation market, dominant carriers are majority-owned and managed by 
either central or local governments. Supporting services and inputs are also controlled 
by state-owned companies with significant market power. The central government 
owns the largest three airline groups as well as the dominant/monopoly companies that 
provide fuelling services, ticketing and airport IT services, fleet purchasing and leasing 
services. The regulator has shown little concern over market consolidation and 
competition. Only a few private airlines have been allowed to enter the market, and 
they are still much smaller than their state-owned peers. 
 
 The regulations on route entry and airport slot allocation in China provide preferential 
treatment to dominant carriers, making it difficult for other airlines to compete in major 
hubs, which account for a significant share of the Chinese market. There is evidence 
that dominant airlines have improved their hub-and-spoke networks, but there are also 
signs that precious airport slots have not been allocated in an efficient manner.   
 
In summary, the Chinese government has attempted to help major airlines grow in size, 
rather than forcing them to improve and innovate through increased competition and thus 
achieve global competitiveness. Chinese airlines have not bridged the efficiency gaps among 
global leaders. Hub airports could have enjoyed better aviation services and network 
connectivity if more liberalization policies had been introduced.  
Chinese airlines are currently more competitive in providing services to destinations in 
Europe, Asia, and Oceania than to North America destinations. They will therefore be more 
open to liberalization agreements with these countries, and develop their hubs into Asia’s 
gateways to Europe. In general, however, there is no sign that these dominant airlines will 
welcome complete liberalization. As an intermediate compromise (in place of an optimal policy 
in the long term), promoting LCC services in the NEA region is a practical policy. Liberalizing 
LCC services will not significantly influence competition between network carriers on 
intercontinental routes. Whereas route entry and slot allocation at hub airports are closely 
monitored, regulators and major carriers are not particularly concerned with the expansion of 
LCCs at regional airports. Local governments also welcome new services, which improve their 
airports’ connectivity and contribute to the regional economy. Therefore, promoting LCC entry 
can be a feasible and useful first step toward full liberalization.  
In the longer term, however, there is a need to fully liberalize the aviation markets in the 
region. The priority of governments should be to maximize the welfare of the nation as a whole, 
rather than just protecting the airlines. Adler et. al (2014) modeled transport market in 
Northeast Asia using an airline network model. They found that air transport liberalization 
would benefit both consumers and the aviation industry in the region albeit not necessarily on 
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an equal basis across or within groups. They also noted that airport slot allocation policies play 
an important role in the realization and distribution of potential welfare gains related to 
liberalization. Therefore, government agencies should implement liberalization and airport slot 
allocation policies jointly. Studies in the airline sector, together with lessons learned in other 
industries, have also shown that a “national-champion” strategy rarely works. It is increased 
competition that forces airlines to improve and innovate, leading to global competitiveness and 
sustain long-term growth.  
As discussed, Korean and Japanese governments, and to some extent their transport 
ministry officials, now realize that opening up the air transport market in the Northeast Asian 
region is an important economic issue.  However, the current dominant players in China’s air 
transport sector, somewhat helped by the CAAC’s regulations, have restricted domestic 
competition and foreign carrier entries, particularly services to airports in the metropolitan 
areas of Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou. This policy is likely to continue until one or more 
of the following happens: 
 
 A shift in attitudes of Chinese leaders and elites towards supporting liberalization: 
China’s three major carriers are now among the largest carriers in Asia, and are on 
their way to becoming the largest carriers in the world within this decade.5  Policies 
designed to protect them are akin to ‘treating giants as babies,’ which makes little 
sense. Unless CAAC’s senior officers and bureaucrats realize this soon, it will become 
apparent to China’s economic leaders and elites, and perhaps even the state leaders, 
that this is a wrong air transport policy, which can harm China’s economy and ordinary 
citizens. 
 
 Informed policy changes: In the next few years, Korea and/or Japan may add the issue 
of air transport to China-Korea, China-Japan and/or tripartite Economic Summit 
meetings agenda so that trade, investment, and air transport opportunities can be 
weighed up. Instead of postponing industry reform and restructuring for as long as 
possible, it is better for the transport ministry and CAAC officials to proactively design 
deregulation / liberalization policies with a clear road map. With informed policy 
changes ahead, the Chinese aviation sector can innovate and improve to achieve 
international competitiveness. 
 
 Increasing pressure from private airlines and central government agencies: Over time, 
other central government agencies, together with local governments and airports, will 
see the opportunities that foreign carrier entries can bring, and help them achieve 
important political and economic objectives. Private airlines will request more freedom 
to operate and compete with state-owned carriers on an equal basis. There will be 
increased pressure for deregulation and liberalization. 
 
The CAAC and major carriers in China may also want to open up markets to their Asian 
neighbors for their own benefit.  Our reasoning on this is as follows: 
 
 As already examined, China’s major airlines and airports are well positioned to route 
European-bound Asian traffic via their major hubs in China (Beijing, Shanghai, 
                                                             
5 The CAPA Center for Aviation (CAPA 2015) reported that China Southern Airlines carried more than 100 
million passengers in 2014, marking the company the sixth airline group in the world to transport over 100 million 
passengers a year. The Air China and China Eastern groups are expected to cross the mark, with the HNA Group 
to carry 100 million passengers within 5 years. China is expected to have four groups with over 100 million 
passengers, matching the US. 
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Guangzhou, Chengdu, etc.), including connecting traffic originating from or flying to 
Korea and Japan. With continued investments in airports and air traffic control systems, 
such as the planned second-airports in Beijing and Chengdu, more capacity will be 
available in the Chinese aviation system, facilitating its airlines and airports to expand 
internationally; 
 
 With higher service frequencies from the current and future mega-hubs to 
intercontinental destinations (including North America and Europe) in the future,  
Chinese airlines can increasingly attract more overseas passengers  from Japan and 
Korea to connect via Chinese hub airports.  When China’s air travel propensity 
increases to 0.75 per capita, its air transport market will exceed that of the United States. 
By then China’s mega-hubs are likely to assume similar roles in Asia to those of 
Chicago, Atlanta, and Dallas in the US, offering a high frequency of services to major 
intercontinental destinations in Europe and North America.  
 
The benefits of air transport liberalization have been confirmed by many studies examining 
mature markets. More investigations into the NEA aviation markets are needed so governments 
and regulators in the region can make informed decisions and commit to a clear road-map for 
liberalization. Air transport liberalization is a dynamic process. The development of airline 
markets is related to the economic growth that a region enjoys. Further, as the airline market 
develops, interest groups and stake-holders may favor a more open environment and press for 
liberalization.6 If regulators and major carriers in the region fully recognize the opportunities 
which may be realized within this decade, there can be a rational move by these power brokers 
to proactively push for liberalization, instead of trying to kick the can down the road as long as 
possible. 
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 Table 1. Airport Slot Control and Coordination at Selected Chinese Airports 
 
Airport 
Peak-hour 
Movement  
Limit (per hour) 
Coordinated   
Time Period 
Effective  
Since 
Beijing 88 06:00—02:00 2011.12.15 
Shanghai Pudong 65 06:00—02:00 2010.5.1 
Guangzhou 58 06:00—02:00 2010.3.28 
Xi'an 45 06:00—02:00 2012.5.7 
Shanghai Hongqiao 43 06:00—02:00 2010.5.1 
Chongqing 42 06:00—02:00 2012.5.25 
Shenzhen 34 06:00—02:00 2011.2.9 
Chengdu 34 06:00—02:00 2012.3.25 
Wuhan 33 06:00—02:00 2012.3.25 
Hangzhou 31 06:00—02:00 2012.3.25 
Nanjing 28 06:00—02:00 2012.3.25 
Qingdao 28 06:00—02:00 2012.3.25 
Xiamen 28 06:00—02:00 2011.2.9 
Dalian 27 06:00—02:00 2012.5.25 
Changsha 27 06:00—02:00 2011.2.9 
Haikou 27 06:00—02:00 2011.2.9 
Urumqi 25 08:00—04:00 2011.8.15 
Tianjin 24 06:00—02:00 2011.1.13 
Fuzhou 23 06:00—02:00 2011.2.9 
Sanya 20 06:00—02:00 2011.2.9 
Source: Compiled by the authors 
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Table 2. Market Shares of the Top-10 Chinese Airports  
 
Market Share by Passenger Volume (Unit %) 
Year 09 Rank 2009 2008 2005 2002 1998 
Beijing  1 13.45 13.79 14.42 15.85 15.23 
Guangzhou 2 7.62 8.24 8.28 9.34 10.92 
Shanghai / Pudong 3 6.57 6.7 8.32 6.45  N/A 
Shanghai / Hongqiao 4 5.16 5.64 6.26 7.98 12.05 
Shenzhen 5 5.04 5.27 5.73 5.46 4.53 
Chengdu 6 4.66 4.25 4.89 4.40 3.86 
Kunming 7 3.90 3.91 4.16 4.14 4.33 
Xi'an 8 3.15 2.94 2.79 2.59 2.52 
Hangzhou 9 3.07 3.12 2.85 2.26 2.00 
Chongqing 10 2.89 2.75 2.33 2.26 2.07 
Total   55.51 56.61 60.03 60.73 57.51 
Market Share by Cargo Volume (Unit %) 
Year 09 Rank 2009 2008 2005 2002 1998 
Shanghai / Pudong 1 26.9 29.5 29.3 15.8 N/A  
Beijing 2 15.6 15.5 12.4 15.7 17.7 
Guangzhou 3 10.1 7.8 9.5 12.4 14.1 
Shenzhen 4 6.4 6.8 7.4 7.2 4.0 
Shanghai / Hongqiao 5 4.6 4.7 5.7 10.9 19.8 
Chengdu 6 4.0 4.2 4.0 4.0 3.8 
Kunming 7 2.7 2.7 3.1 3.0 3.5 
Hangzhou 8 2.4 2.4 2.6 2.2 1.9 
Nanjing 9 2.1 2.1 2.2 1.3 1.1 
Xiamen 10 2.1 2.2 2.5 2.7 3.3 
Total   76.92 77.9 78.70 75.20 69.20 
Note: Shanghai Pudong International Airport was in service on 1 Oct 1999 
Source: Fu et al. (2012) 
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Table 3.1 Average aircraft size on routes between different sized airports 
 
2002 
  Top 10 airports Airports ranked 11-50 Other airports 
Top 10 airports 182 (33.14) 148 (35.92) 113 (49.30) 
Airports ranked 11-50   123 (48.69) 91 (55.66) 
Other airports     155 (50.28) 
2008 
  Top 10 airports Airports ranked 11-50 Other airports 
Top 10 airports 166 (32.05) 146 (21.48) 115 (43.82) 
Airports ranked 11-50   134 (38.44) 100 (51.40) 
Other airports     85 (55.26) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. 
Source: Wang et al. (2014b) 
 
 
Table 3.2 Weekly average flight frequency on routes between different-sized airports 
 
2002 
  Top 10 airports Airports ranked 11-50 Other airports 
Top 10 airports 78.5 (61.67) 26.8 (27.62) 6.6 (8.30) 
Airports ranked 11-50   9.1 (9.20) 7.9 (9.68) 
Other airports     3.5 (2.03) 
2008 
  Top 10 airports Airports ranked 11-50 Other airports 
Top 10 airports 168.6 (104.41) 50.2 (48.71) 10.6 (14.31) 
Airports ranked 11-50   14.8 (16.10) 8.6 (12.73) 
Other airports     10.9 (16.59) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. 
Source: Wang et al. (2014b) 
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Table 4. Benchmark Major Airlines’ Performance in NEA 
 
2001 
China 
Southern 
China 
Eastern 
Air China 
Korean 
Air 
Asiana 
Japan 
Air 
ANA 
Total Revenue (million US$ current price) 2,039 1,468 2,747 4,393  1,718  12,095 N/A 
Total Profit (million US$ current price) 169 69 115 718  344  -276 N/A 
Revenue Passenger (1,000) 19,121 10,371 15,600 21,638  11,931  37,183 N/A 
Number of Aircraft 111 70 114 127 59 173 N/A 
% of Cargo Revenue  8% 17.20% 15% 27.81% 28.24% 14.90% N/A 
% of International RPK  22.40% N/A 46% 88.67% 84.21% 77.23% N/A 
2006 
China 
Southern 
China 
Eastern 
Air China 
Korean 
Air 
Asiana 
Japan 
Air 
ANA 
Total Revenue (million US$ current price) 5,797 4,842 5,636 8,455  3,613  19,499 11,769 
Total Profit (million US$ current price) 26 -433 415 1,856  706  -138 230 
Revenue Passenger (1,000) 49,206 35,040 33,971 22,353  12,767  57,452 49,609 
Number of Aircraft 309 205 225 116  65  N/A N/A 
% of Cargo Revenue  7.70% 15% 9% 31.36% 27.68% 9.50% 6.21% 
% of International RPK  17% 37.80% 48.00% 92.85% 91.50% 65.35% 32.10% 
2012 
China 
Southern 
China 
Eastern 
Air China 
Korean 
Air 
Asiana 
Japan 
Air 
ANA 
Total Revenue (million US$ current price) 15,771 13,511 15,981 10,883  5,003  14,509 16,998 
Total Profit (million US$ current price) 808 445 781 1,238  598  2,247 339 
Revenue Passenger (1,000) 86,485 73,077 72,416 24,283  15,514  37,564 44,903 
Number of Aircraft 491 428 461 142 71 216 230 
% of Cargo Revenue  6.60% 10.10% 8.40% 25.27% 25.73% 6.54% 8.59% 
% of International RPK  20.80% 30.20% 33.30% 96.19% 94.94% 89.64% 42.30% 
Source: Company's annual reports and industry sources 
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Table 5. Gross Total Factor Productivity (TFP) Index of Major Airlines  
(Normalized at American Airlines 2005=1) 
Year 
China 
Eastern 
China 
Southern 
Air 
China 
Chinese 
A.V.G 
Thai 
Airways Singapore Cathay American Delta United Continental 
Air  
Canada 
North 
American 
A.V.G Lufthansa 
Air 
France KLM 
2001 0.49 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.68 1.12 1.04 0.72 0.77 0.79 0.88 0.76 0.78 0.64  0.85 
2002 0.50 0.54 0.53 0.52 0.73 1.01 1.17 0.74 0.81 0.92 0.86 0.79 0.82 0.67 0.71 0.83 
2003 0.49 0.50 0.54 0.51 0.66 1.01 1.11 0.85 0.89 0.99 0.98 0.80 0.91 0.65 0.75 0.82 
2004 0.60 0.56 0.63 0.60 0.70 1.01 1.10 0.94 0.86 1.07 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.70 0.77 0.94 
2005 0.56 0.57 0.68 0.61 0.70 1.10 1.10 1.00 1.01 1.11 0.99 0.91 1.01 0.72 0.89 0.89 
2006 0.59 0.61 0.75 0.65 0.74 1.29 1.05 1.04 1.06 1.15 1.03 0.92 1.05 0.71 0.88 0.88 
2007 0.63 0.66 0.76 0.69 0.78 1.32 1.03 1.05 1.01 1.14 1.06 0.94 1.05 0.74 0.90 0.90 
2008 0.60 0.67 0.64 0.64 0.68 1.32 1.02 0.98 0.75 0.98 1.05 0.95 0.93 0.74 0.92 0.92 
2009 0.62 0.68 0.75 0.69 0.74 1.33 1.10 1.02 1.03 1.12 1.09 0.91 1.04 0.71 0.95 0.95 
2010 0.71 0.72 0.77 0.74 0.86 1.30 1.11 1.06 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.00 1.07 0.74 0.95 0.95 
 
Note: 1. United Airlines and Continental Airlines merged in 2010. Thus the TFP for the two airlines in 2010 is for the new merged airline. 
     2. Air France and KLM merged in 2005. Thus the TFP for the two airlines from 2005 to 2010 are for the new merged airline. 
     3. The weight used to calculate the Chinese and North American average TFP is the airlines’ revenue share. 
 
Source: Wang et al. (2014a)
26 
 
 
Table 6. NEA Airline Service to North American Destinations 
 
2001 Chinese Carriers Japanese Carriers Korean Carriers 
# of Airports 3  10  11  
Weekly Frequency 23  198  92  
Weekly Seats 8,008  69,771  31,809  
# Airlines 3  3  2  
2006 Chinese Carriers Japanese Carriers Korean Carriers 
# of Airports 4  9  11  
Weekly Frequency 47  145  100  
Weekly Seats 14,252  47,104  34,410  
# Airlines 3  4  2  
2012 Chinese Carriers Japanese Carriers Korean Carriers 
# of Airports 7  8  12  
Weekly Frequency 87  147  140  
Weekly Seats 24,981  39,186  45,049  
# Airlines 5  3  2  
2014 Chinese Carriers Japanese Carriers Korean Carriers 
# of Airports 11  11  13  
Weekly Frequency 154  189  152  
Weekly Seats 42,412  41,446  47,455  
# Airlines 5  2  2  
 Source: OAG database for scheduled flights   
Note: The number of airports refers to the number of airports served with direct 
flights. The first week of July in the sample year is referred for weekly statistics. 
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Table 7. NEA Airline Service to European Destinations 
 
2001 Chinese Carriers Japanese Carriers Korean Carriers 
# of Airports 9  9  6  
Weekly Frequency 39  78  24  
Weekly Seats 11,426  26,919  8,904  
# Airlines 3  2  2  
2006 Chinese Carriers Japanese Carriers Korean Carriers 
# of Airports 12  8  10  
Weekly Frequency 96  79  53  
Weekly Seats 28,234  25,261  18,040  
# Airlines 4  2  2  
2012 Chinese Carriers Japanese Carriers Korean Carriers 
# of Airports 19  5  12  
Weekly Frequency 181  66  72  
Weekly Seats 44,823  21,232  23,859  
# Airlines 4  2  2  
2014 Chinese Carriers Japanese Carriers Korean Carriers 
# of Airports 20  7  12  
Weekly Frequency 219  88  82  
Weekly Seats 54,801  18,151  23,778  
# Airlines 4  2  2  
 Source: OAG database for scheduled flights   
Note: The number of airports refers to the number of airports served with direct flights. The 
first week of July in the sample year is referred for weekly statistics. 
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Table 8. NEA Airline Service to Destinations in Asia and Oceania  
(International markets only) 
 
2001 Chinese Carriers Japanese Carriers Korean Carriers 
# of Airports 43  25  55  
Weekly Frequency 735  471  454  
Weekly Seats 145,694  140,318  118,803  
# Airlines 11  6  2  
2006 Chinese Carriers Japanese Carriers Korean Carriers 
# of Airports 55  28  83  
Weekly Frequency 1,277  638  826  
Weekly Seats 235,298  166,689  214,628  
# Airlines 8  5  2  
2012 Chinese Carriers Japanese Carriers Korean Carriers 
# of Airports 78  30  97  
Weekly Frequency 2,036  669  1,526  
Weekly Seats 353,838  133,473  338,856  
# Airlines 12  3  7  
2014 Chinese Carriers Japanese Carriers Korean Carriers 
# of Airports 84  31  101  
Weekly Frequency 2,479  771  1,637  
Weekly Seats 436,846  165,452  356,215  
# Airlines 14  4  7  
 Source: OAG database for scheduled flights   
Note: The number of airports refers to the number of airports served with direct flights. The 
first week of July in the sample year is referred for weekly statistics. 
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Table 9. Hub Airport Performance Benchmarking 
2001 
Shanghai 
Pudong (PVG) 
Shanghai 
Hongqiao (SHA) Beijing (PEK) 
Guangzhou 
(CAN) Seoul (ICN) Tokyo (NRT) 
Number of Asia-Oceania Destinations and weekly Frequency 6 / 37 19 / 268 17 / 247 14 / 94 63 / 697 33 / 529 
Number of European Destinations and weekly frequency 5 / 27 - 15 / 80 - 8 / 46 13 / 151 
Number of North American Destinations and weekly 
frequency 4 / 30 - 4 / 24 1 / 4 11 / 116 18 / 345 
Other - - 2 / 3 - 1 / 2 1 / 1 
2006 
Shanghai 
Pudong (PVG) 
Shanghai 
Hongqiao (SHA) Beijing (PEK) 
Guangzhou 
(CAN) Seoul (ICN) Tokyo (NRT) 
Number of Asia-Oceania Destinations and weekly Frequency 38 / 750 - 29 / 448 20 / 221 87 / 1126 43 / 880 
Number of European Destinations and weekly frequency 12 / 111 - 16 / 147 3 / 16 10 / 81 13 / 168 
Number of North American Destinations and weekly 
frequency 5 / 45 - 7 / 61 1 / 7 11 / 130 19 / 341 
Other (Intl) - - 4 / 15 1 / 3 2 / 11 1 / 3 
2012 
Shanghai 
Pudong (PVG) 
Shanghai 
Hongqiao (SHA) Beijing (PEK) 
Guangzhou 
(CAN) Seoul (ICN) Tokyo (NRT) 
Number of Asia-Oceania Destinations and weekly Frequency 48 / 985 5 / 139 41 / 656 34 / 423 101 / 1775 48 / 935 
Number of European Destinations and weekly frequency 16 / 190 - 25 / 210 11 / 66 23 / 185 26 / 271 
Number of North American Destinations and weekly 
frequency 9 / 90 - 10 / 106 2 / 12 13 / 175 18 / 320 
Other (Intl) 4 / 30 - 11 / 58 5 / 36 5 / 32 4 / 17 
2014 
Shanghai 
Pudong (PVG) 
Shanghai 
Hongqiao (SHA) Beijing (PEK) 
Guangzhou 
(CAN) Seoul (ICN) Tokyo (NRT) 
Number of Asia-Oceania Destinations and weekly Frequency 56 / 1168 6 / 136 48 / 660 39 / 449 102 / 2009 49 / 962 
Number of European Destinations and weekly frequency 12 / 161 - 24 / 210 5 / 45 14 /145 16 / 136 
Number of North American Destinations and weekly 
frequency 11 / 130 - 13 / 148 2 / 14 14 / 203 20 / 338 
Other (Intl) 7 / 46 - 11 / 56 8 / 41 6 / 34 4 / 25 
Source: OAG database for scheduled flights 
Note: Weekly data are the data of first week in July for each selected year. 
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Table 10. NEA Low Cost Carrier Profile 
Country 
Airlines (code) 
Fleet 
size 
Service 
Starting Date Key share-holder and /or parent airline Main Hub 
 Spring Airline (9C) 41 18-Jul-05 Shanghai Spring International Travel Service Shanghai Hongqiao Airport 
  Lucky Air (8L) 26 Jul-04 Hainan Airlines Group (HNA) Kunming Airport 
 China West Air (PN) 14 14-Jul-10 Hainan Airlines Group (HNA) Chongqing Airport 
  Juneyao Airlines* (HO) 34 Jun-05 Juneyao Group Shanghai Hongqiao Airport 
 Air Do 13 Oct-12 ANA, DBJ(Development Bank of Japan) Tokyo Haneda Airport 
  Jetstar Japan (GK) 18 3-Jul-12 Qantas, Japan Airlines  Tokyo Narita Airport 
  Peach (MM) 13 Mar-12 ANA,First Eastern Investment Group and INCJ Osaka Kansai Airport 
 Japan Skymark Airlines (BC) 32 19-Sep-98 Shinichi Nishikubo Tokyo Haneda Airport 
  Solaseed Air (6J) 13 Jul-11 Miyakoh Holding  Tokyo Haneda Airport 
  StarFlyer (7G) 10 16-Mar-06 Star Flyer Inc. Tokyo Haneda Airport 
  Vanilla Air (JW) 6 20-Dec-13 ANA Tokyo Narita Airport 
 Air Busan (BX) 12 Oct-08 Asiana Airlines Busan Gimhae Airport 
  Eastar Jet (ZE) 8 7-Jan-09 Privately owned, not listed Jeju Airport 
 Korea Jeju Air (7C)  15 2-Jun-06 Aekyung Group Jeju Airport 
  Jin Air (LJ) 11 Jul-08 Korean Air  Jeju Airport 
  t'way (TW) 7 Sep-10 KDIC, YeaRimDang Publishing Seoul Gimpo Airport 
Note: Fleet statistics as of June 2014. Service starting date refers to the date when the airline began to offer services under the current name. 
*Juneyao Airlines provides similar services to those offered by network carriers and may not be a typical LCC. It is however been included in 
several industry LCC reports, and so included in our analysis. 
Source: Company's official website and annual reports. 
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Table 11. NEA LCC Service Overview as of July 2014 
Airline Country 
Number of 
domestic 
destination
s 
Domestic 
Weekly 
frequency 
Number of 
internationa
l destination 
Internationa
l Weekly 
frequency 
Lucky Air China 44 1112 2 2 
Ruili Airlines China 7 98 - - 
Spring Airlines China 38 1162 24 184 
West Air China 35 576 - - 
HK Express 
Hong 
Kong - - 17 164 
Air Do Japan 14 517 - - 
AirAsia Japan Co 
Ltd 
Japan 
3 126 4 56 
Jetstar Japan Japan 10 586 - - 
Peach Japan 10 346 9 140 
Skymark Airlines Japan 14 1144 - - 
StarFlyer Japan 5 420 - - 
Vanilla Air Japan 3 126 4 56 
Air Busan Korea 3 432 20 162 
Eastar Jet Korea - - 15 90 
Jeju Air Korea 5 400 19 240 
Jin Air Korea 2 170 36 152 
T'way Korea 3 250 10 56 
Source: Compiled with OAG airline schedule data for the first week of July 2014. 
Table 12. LCC Entry to NEA Countries 
(As of the 1st Week of July 2014) 
Foreign LCC Entry to China (1st Week of July, 2014) 
Chinese airports 
Number of 
Foreign 
LCCs 
Number of 
Japanese 
LCCs  
Number of 
Korean 
LCCs 
Frequency of 
Foreign 
LCCs 
Frequency  
of Japanese 
LCCs  
Frequency  of 
Korean 
LCCs 
Guangzhou 4 0 0 54 0 0 
Hangzhou 5 0 1 42 0 2 
Shenzhen 3 0 0 33 0 0 
Shanghai Pudong 4 0 1 31 0 7 
Qingdao 4 0 2 20 0 14 
Xi'an 5 0 2 20 0 6 
Wuhan 2 0 1 15 0 1 
Chongqing 1 0 0 14 0 0 
Kunming 2 0 0 14 0 0 
Beijing 3 0 0 12 0 0 
Nanjing 2 0 0 11 0 0 
Chengdu 2 0 1 9 0 2 
Jinan 2 0 2 9 0 9 
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Haikou 2 0 0 8 0 0 
Ningbo 2 0 0 8 0 0 
Changsha 1 0 0 7 0 0 
Nanning 1 0 0 7 0 0 
Shenyang 2 0 1 5 0 3 
Tianjin 2 0 1 5 0 2 
Guilin 1 0 0 4 0 0 
Shantou 1 0 0 4 0 0 
Xiamen 2 0 1 4 0 2 
Yantai 1 0 1 4 0 4 
Quanzhou 1 0 0 3 0 0 
Changchun 1 0 1 2 0 2 
Hohhot 1 0 1 2 0 2 
Lijiang 1 0 0 2 0 0 
Taiyuan 1 0 1 2 0 2 
Yinchuan 1 0 1 2 0 2 
Dalian 1 0 1 1 0 1 
Harbin 1 0 1 1 0 1 
Hefei 1 0 1 1 0 1 
Nanchang 1 0 1 1 0 1 
Shijiazhuang 1 0 1 1 0 1 
Yanji 1 0 1 1 0 1 
Zhengzhou 1 0 1 1 0 1 
Foreign LCC Entry to Japan (1st Week of July, 2014) 
Japanese Airports 
Number of 
Foreign 
LCCs 
Number of 
Chinese 
LCCs  
Number of 
Korean 
LCCs 
Frequency of 
Foreign 
LCCs 
Frequency  
of Chinese 
LCCs  
Frequency  of 
Korean 
LCCs 
Osaka Kansai International  8 0 3 78 0 35 
Tokyo Narita Intl 6 0 3 58 0 28 
Fukuoka 5 0 3 42 0 28 
Nagoya Chubu Centrair 3 0 1 22 0 14 
Tokyo Intl (Haneda) 2 0 0 14 0 0 
Sapporo New Chitose Apt 2 0 2 11 0 11 
Okinawa Naha Apt 1 0 1 7 0 7 
Hiroshima 1 1 0 6 6 0 
Ibaraki 1 1 0 6 6 0 
Saga 2 1 1 6 3 3 
Nagasaki 1 0 1 3 0 3 
Takamatsu 1 1 0 3 3 0 
Foreign LCC Entry to Korea (1st Week of July, 2014) 
Korean Airports 
Number of 
Foreign 
LCCs 
Number of 
Chinese 
LCCs  
Number of 
Japanese 
LCCs 
Frequency of 
Foreign 
LCCs 
Frequency  
of Chinese 
LCCs  
Frequency  of 
Japanese 
LCCs 
Busan 4 0 1 21 0 7 
Jeju International 1 1 0 7 7 0 
Seoul Incheon  8 0 2 126 0 35 
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Note: Summary statistics for China do not include LCCs in Hong Kong and Taiwan due to the special 
arrangements between these two regions with mainland China. 
